Persona: Teira Serrano, David
Cargando...
Dirección de correo electrónico
ORCID
0000-0002-4551-2371
Fecha de nacimiento
Proyectos de investigación
Unidades organizativas
Puesto de trabajo
Apellidos
Teira Serrano
Nombre de pila
David
Nombre
3 resultados
Resultados de la búsqueda
Mostrando 1 - 3 de 3
Publicación Facts, Norms and Expected Utility Functions(2008-05-15) Jallais, Sophie; Pradier, Pierre Charles; Teira Serrano, DavidIn this paper we want to explore an argumentative pattern that provides a normative justification for expected utility functions grounded on empirical evidence, showing how it worked in three different episodes of their development. The argument claims that we should prudentially maximize our expected utility since this is the criterion effectively applied by those who are considered wisest in making risky choices (be it gamblers or businessmen). Yet, to justify the adoption of this rule, it should be proven that this is empirically true: i.e., that a given function allows us to predict the choices of that particular class of agents. We show how expected utility functions were introduced and contested in accordance with this pattern in the 18th century and how it recurred in the 1950s when M. Allais made his case against the neobernoulliansPublicación What was fair in actuarial fairness?(2019-06-06) Heras Martínez, Antonio José; Pradier, Pierre Charles; Teira Serrano, DavidIn actuarial parlance, the price of an insurance policy is considered fair if customers bearing the same risks are charged the same price. The estimate of this fair amount hinges on the expected value obtained weighting the different claims by their probability. We claim that, historically, this concept of actuarial fairness originates in an Aristotelian principle of justice in exchange (equality in risk). We will examine how this principle was formalized in the 16th century and shaped in life insurance during the next two hundred years, in two different interpretations. The Domatian account of actuarial fairness relies on subjective uncertainty: an agreement on risk is fair if both parties are equally ignorant about the chances of an uncertain event. The objectivist version grounds any agreement on an objective risk estimate drawn from a mortality table. We will show how the objectivist approach collapsed in the market for life annuities during the 18th century, leaving open the question of why we still speak of actuarial fairness as if it were an objective expected value.Publicación A contractarian approach to actuarial fairness(2024-01-21) Heras Martínez, Antonio José; Pradier, Pierre Charles; Teira Serrano, DavidWe defend, from a contractarian perspective, that the fair price of an insurance policy is the amount that the contracting parties agree when they are both equally uncertain about the insured event. Drawing on the approach developed by R. Sugden in The Community of Advantage, we answer two standard objections raised against contractarianism in the actuarial sciences: 1) people are not wise enough to assess their actuarial risks; 2) they are not rational enough to decide which insurance policy suits them better. We show under which circumstances people can make fair actuarial agreements, without presupposing any objective risk or rationality benchmarks.