Casetta, ElenaVecchi, Davide2026-02-242026-02-242019-04-05Casetta, E., Vecchi, D. Species are, at the same time, kinds and individuals: a causal argument based on an empirical approach to species identity. Synthese 198 (Suppl 12), 3007–3025 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02199-50039-7857https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02199-5https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/31922This is the Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Springer in "Synthese 198, 2021", available online: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02199-5Este es el manuscrito aceptado de un artículo publicado por Springer en " Synthese 198, 2021", disponible en línea: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02199-5After having reconstructed a minimal biological characterisation of species, we endorse an “empirical approach” based on the idea that it is the peculiar evolutionary history of the species at issue—its peculiar origination process, its peculiar metapopulation structure and the peculiar mixture and strength of homeostatic processes vis à vis heterostatic ones—that determines species’ identity at a time and through time. We then explore the consequences of the acceptance of the empirical approach in settling the individuals versus kinds dispute. In particular, while conceptual arguments have been proposed to show that species can be equally treated as individuals and kinds because mereology’s and set-theory’s languages are inter-translatable, we advance instead a causal argument to sustain the claim that each species is both a kind (i.e., a class whose members share some properties included in a cluster) and an individual (i.e., a whole made of parts).eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess72 Filosofía11 Lógicaartículobiological speciesHPC kindsspecies-individuals1573-0964