Vecchi, Davide2026-02-242026-02-242019-03-26Vecchi, D. 2020a. Entrenchment implies that physiological and developmental processes are not organism-bound but still organism-centric. Adaptive Behavior 28(1):33-34. DOI: 10.1177/10597123198388011059-7123https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712319838801https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/31919This is the Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Sage Journals in "Adaptive Behavior 28, 2020", available online: https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712319838801Este es el manuscrito aceptado de un artículo publicado por Sage Journals en "Adaptive Behavior 28, 2020", disponible en línea: https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712319838801Villalobos and Razeto-Barry argue that all living beings possess discrete bodies and that, as a consequence, embodied living beings are merely embedded in the environment surrounding them. The upshot of their analysis is that an extended conception of life is misguided. I fundamentally agree with their argument. The authors make their case by clarifying the conceptual scaffolding of the theory of autopoiesis that supposedly engenders the extended approach. I think the critical argument can be supported in a more straightforward way by showing that the biological fact of entrenchment (West-Eberhard 2003, pp. 500-503) does not imply an extension of the physical boundaries of the organism.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess72 Filosofía11 Lógicaartículoentrenchmentorganismenvironment1741-2633