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Fecha
2024-01-10
Derechos de acceso
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Título de la revista
ISSN de la revista
Título del volumen
Editorial
Elsevier
Citas
Resumen
This paper analyzes the determinants of welfare benefit levels within a highly fiscally decentralized context. More specifically, we analyze the role of mimicking as a driver of the institutional design of subnational government policies in the absence of federal co-ordination and financing. Empirically we focus on the welfare benefit programs of Spanish regional governments during the period 1996-2015. Our results strongly support the significant role played by mimicking: regional public agents observe what their peers are doing and act accordingly, and this holds even in a context of low mobility of households.
Descripción
The registered version of this article, first published in Papers in Regional Science, is available online at the publisher's website: Elsevier, https://doi.org/10.1111/pirs.12605
La versión registrada de este artículo, publicado por primera vez en Papers in Regional Science, está disponible en línea en el sitio web del editor: Elsevier, https://doi.org/10.1111/pirs.12605
La versión registrada de este artículo, publicado por primera vez en Papers in Regional Science, está disponible en línea en el sitio web del editor: Elsevier, https://doi.org/10.1111/pirs.12605
Categorías UNESCO
Palabras clave
welfare, fiscal federalism, yardstick competition, inequality
Citación
Herrero-Alcalde, A.; L. Ayala-Cañón; y J. Martinez-Vazquez (2021): “Welfare benefits in highly decentralized fiscal systems: Evidence on interregional mimicking”, Papers in Regional Science, 100(5), 1178-1209, DOI: 10.1111/pirs.12605 (Working Paper GSU)
Centro
Facultad de Derecho
Departamento
Economía Aplicada y Gestión Pública