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El trabajo compara la libertad de comunicación en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo de Estados Unidos y del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, pero partiendo de la primera de ellas. Existen diferencias, que se especifican. Los textos reguladores invitan a hablar de dualidad de modelos. Pero tal vez sea excesivo. Consideraciones finales: 1) existen muchos regímenes de la libertad de expresión compatibles con la democracia: el generado a partir de la sentencia Sullivan en Estados Unidos, (en Europa, Lingens) no es el único, aunque en la actualidad se considera el más coherente con ella, lo que no se discute. 2) Los grandes cambios se producen a veces en virtud de detalles aparentemente pequeños. El cambio de la carga de la prueba en la difamación (Sullivan) ha supuesto un terremoto en el régimen jurídico de la prensa. La doctrina Sullivan se puede resumir en los siguientes puntos: primero, los errores son inevitables para respirar; segundo: ha de probarse la malicia del difamador; tercero, ha de probarse la falta de veracidad del difamador. Esta doctrina le permite jugar a la prensa su papel de “perro guardián” de las libertades. 3º) En nuestro país la prensa parece ejercer también ese papel, y esto nos exige preguntarnos si hay o hubo una Sentencia Sullivan en nuestra jurisprudencia; solemos atribuir la privilegiada posición de la prensa entre nosotros a que el Tribunal Constitucional la ha dotado de posición preferencial sobre los derechos que entran en colisión con ella, como honor, intimidad y propia imagen, y se justifica esa posición preferencial por su conexión con la democracia; pues bien, ya desde la STC 6/1981, de 16 marzo, nuestro Tribunal Constitucional venía subrayando la importancia de las libertades informativas para la democracia; y desde la STC 159/1986, del 16 diciembre, venía hablando de posición preferencial de la libertad de expresión; sin embargo, la incorporación de la jurisprudencia Sullivan a nuestro sistema se produce en la STC 6/1988, de 21 enero, casi 10 años después de la aprobación de la Constitución.
This paper compares the freedom of communication in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States and the European Court of Human Rights, departing from the former from the first one. It is noted that there are differences, as specified. Regulatory texts invite to speak of two models, though this may be a far-fetched statement. This paper makes the following concluding remarks: 1) there are many conceptions of freedom of expression that are compatible with democracy: the one derived from the Sullivan judgment in US, (and in Europe from the Lingens judgment) is not the only one, although currently it is considered the most consistent with it, which is not discussed here. 2) Major changes sometimes occur under seemingly small details, but after the fine print. In this sense, the shift of the burden of proof in defamation cases (Sullivan) has been an earthquake in for the legal regime governing the press. The Sullivan doctrine can be summarized as follows: first, errors are inevitable, as freedom of speech needs a “breathing space”; second, the malice of those who defame must be proved; third, it is necessary to prove the lack of veracity of the slanderer. This doctrine allows the press to play its role of "watchdog" of freedom; 3) thirdly, in our country, the press also seems to play that role, and this requires us to ask whether there is, or ever was, a Sullivan judgment in our jurisprudence. We tend to attribute the privileged position of the press among us to the fact that the Constitutional Court has given preferential consideration to freedom of speech when it is in conflict with honor, intimacy privacy and self-image. This preference is justified by its connection to democracy. Since the STC 6/1981 of 16 March, our Constitutional Court had been stressing the importance of freedom of information for democracy, and since the STC 159/1986 of 16 December, the Constitutional Court came to suggest the preferential position of freedom of expression. However, the incorporation of the Sullivan doctrine in the Spanish system takes place through STC 6/1988 of 21 January, almost ten years after the passage of the Constitution.
This paper compares the freedom of communication in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States and the European Court of Human Rights, departing from the former from the first one. It is noted that there are differences, as specified. Regulatory texts invite to speak of two models, though this may be a far-fetched statement. This paper makes the following concluding remarks: 1) there are many conceptions of freedom of expression that are compatible with democracy: the one derived from the Sullivan judgment in US, (and in Europe from the Lingens judgment) is not the only one, although currently it is considered the most consistent with it, which is not discussed here. 2) Major changes sometimes occur under seemingly small details, but after the fine print. In this sense, the shift of the burden of proof in defamation cases (Sullivan) has been an earthquake in for the legal regime governing the press. The Sullivan doctrine can be summarized as follows: first, errors are inevitable, as freedom of speech needs a “breathing space”; second, the malice of those who defame must be proved; third, it is necessary to prove the lack of veracity of the slanderer. This doctrine allows the press to play its role of "watchdog" of freedom; 3) thirdly, in our country, the press also seems to play that role, and this requires us to ask whether there is, or ever was, a Sullivan judgment in our jurisprudence. We tend to attribute the privileged position of the press among us to the fact that the Constitutional Court has given preferential consideration to freedom of speech when it is in conflict with honor, intimacy privacy and self-image. This preference is justified by its connection to democracy. Since the STC 6/1981 of 16 March, our Constitutional Court had been stressing the importance of freedom of information for democracy, and since the STC 159/1986 of 16 December, the Constitutional Court came to suggest the preferential position of freedom of expression. However, the incorporation of the Sullivan doctrine in the Spanish system takes place through STC 6/1988 of 21 January, almost ten years after the passage of the Constitution.
Descripción
La versión registrada de este artículo, publicado por primera vez en Revista de derecho constitucional europeo, está disponible en línea en el sitio web del editor: Universidad de Granada, https://www.ugr.es/~redce/REDCE19/articulos/09_TENORIO.htm
The registered version of this article, first published in Revista de derecho constitucional europeo, is available online at the publisher's website: Universidad de Granada, https://www.ugr.es/~redce/REDCE19/articulos/09_TENORIO.htm
The registered version of this article, first published in Revista de derecho constitucional europeo, is available online at the publisher's website: Universidad de Granada, https://www.ugr.es/~redce/REDCE19/articulos/09_TENORIO.htm
Categorías UNESCO
Palabras clave
Libertad de expresión, libertad de comunicación, Sullivan, Lingens, posición preferente, carga de la prueba, perro guardián, democracia, Freedom of expression, freedom of communication, Sullivan, Lingens, preferred position, burden of proof, watchdog, democracy
Citación
Tenorio Sánchez, P. J. (2013). La libertad de comunicación en Estados Unidos y en Europa. Revista de derecho constitucional europeo, 19, 271-309.
Centro
Facultad de Derecho
Departamento
Derecho Constitucional